2016 Israel Religion & State Index

September 2016
Elul 5776

Pollsters:
Rafi Smith
Olga Paniel

Agree / Disagree that freedom of religion and conscience should be established in Israel by religiosity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religiosity</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ultra-Orthodox</td>
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Index Editor: Shahar Ilan
Graphs: Keren Weisgan
Translation: David Bogomolny
Executive Summary

Weddings outside the auspices of the official State Rabbinate: The number of respondents who do not want Orthodox weddings for themselves or for their children increase dramatically from 37% in 2015 to 47% this year. Among secular Israeli Jews, 78% (i.e. 4 out of 5) are not interested in having Orthodox weddings.

Core curricular studies requirements: An unlawful exemption from core curricular studies. 82% of the Jewish public supports requiring State funded ultra-Orthodox schools to teach mathematics, English, science, and civics. 72% support withholding government funding from schools that refuse to teach the core curriculum.

Support for separation: The public's support for separating religion and state continues to rise. 63% expressed their support for separation, compared to 61% during the past two years and 55% in most previous surveys.

Government funding for yeshivas - cut it! The government budget for yeshivas was doubled. 79% of the Jewish public believes this budget should be cancelled (39%), or cut down to a quarter or half of its current size (40%).

Demand for a pluralistic Western Wall: 55% of the Jewish population say they would visit and use a pluralistic Western Wall plaza area. Of these, 34% would prefer it, and 21% would have no problem using it if it were to become a designated pluralistic prayer space.

Kashrut outside the auspices of the official State Rabbinate: 81% of the Jewish public favors establishing an open market for kashrut supervision and dissolving the Rabbinate's monopoly on kashrut. Of them, 51% support opening the kashrut market to organizations of all Jewish streams, and 29% favor only opening the kashrut market to Orthodox organizations.

A Religious Freedom political party? 54% of secular Israeli Jews and 38% of the public responded that there is a very high or somewhat high probability that they would vote for a potential, newly established political party which would work towards religious freedom and equality of civic burden.

Ultra-Orthodox Jews support employee benefits. Surprisingly, 52% of Shas and United Torah Judaism voters support the government giving preference to those who are working or seeking work when it comes to receiving government benefits.
The Shas party is satisfied. 81% of the Jewish Israeli public is not satisfied with the government's religion and state activities. Shas is the only party with a majority of voters who expressed satisfaction with the government in this arena.

Yeshiva study is not a livelihood: 79% of the Jewish public are in favor of all ultra-Orthodox men entering the workforce (37%) or significantly reducing the number of ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students in Israel (42%).

Civic service is a must: After the Knesset's reversal of the conscription law - 83% of the Jewish public and 91% of the non-Haredi public believe that all yeshiva students or most yeshiva students must serve in Israel's armed forces or do some form of national service.
Dear Index Readers,

We've gone through a very challenging year in matters of religion and state in Israel. The Knesset passed a law that exempted yeshiva students from military service, and another exempting government funded ultra-Orthodox schools from teaching core curricular subjects. The state budget for yeshivas was doubled, and the government's income support for non-working yeshiva students was resumed, even though it was already declared illegal twice by the Supreme Court. Toward the end of the year, the long negotiated Kotel compromise collapsed after being agreed to by all parties, because the Haredi leadership threatened the continued existence of Netanyahu’s coalition if he would implement it, and the Knesset passed a law, as dictated by the Haredi parties, allowing State operated and State funded mikvaot [ritual baths] to deny services to Reform and Conservative converts, against an explicit ruling of the Supreme Court to the contrary, only in order to assert that Israel would not accord any legitimacy to Reform and Conservative, and to teach the Supreme Court a lesson, letting it know its place!

One of the 2016 Israel Religion & State Index's most prominent findings is the public's (including the majority of voters for the civil parties that comprise the government coalition) absolute rejection of the government’s surrender to the ultra-Orthodox parties' political blackmail. 82% of Israeli Jews support mandating the state funded ultra-Orthodox schools to teach mathematics, English, science and civics. 83% of the public (and 83% of Likud party voters) favors compulsory military or civilian service for all or most yeshiva students. 79% of the public believes state funding for yeshivas should be cancelled (39%) or at least significantly decreased (40%).

Hiddush is pleased to present the findings of the 2016 Israel Religion & State Index, the most comprehensive and systematic annual study of its kind, conducted by Hiddush since its inception in 2009. The Index is used by policymakers, opinion molders, analysts in both Israel and the Diaspora, as well as NGOs and the general public. Nothing compares with the Index in its monitoring and analysis of religious freedom and equality of civic burden in Israel.

Since the Index's inception, Hiddush Vice President of Research and Information Shahar Ilan served as its editor and analyst. Mr. Ilan took seven years off from his impressive career in journalism to dedicate himself to civil service at Hiddush. He greatly contributed to the Index’s
professionalism, integrity, reliability, and accessibility. This was Mr. Ilan's final Religion & State Index, as he has now returned to mainstream journalism as a Senior Correspondent at "Calcalist." While we are sad to see him go, we wish the greatest success, and know that he will continue contributing to Israeli society. The Index, of course, will continue with the same integrity and professionalism in the years to come.

Hiddush's primary emphasis in recent years has been the advancement of marriage freedom in Israel, which is consistently supported by the overwhelming majority of the Israeli public. One of the 2016 Index's most striking findings is the dramatic increase in the percentage of respondents who would prefer not to have Orthodox weddings for themselves or their children, which rose from 37% in 2015 to 47% this year. Among secular Israeli Jews, 78% (i.e. 4 in 5) are not interested in having Orthodox wedding ceremonies.

This result is nothing less than revolutionary. It's not merely about theoretical support for marriage freedom, which is important in and of itself, but rather a matter of personal preference. Gone are the days when the religious establishment's representatives could argue that the Israeli public prefers Orthodox marriages. One of every two Israeli Jews, and four out of five secular Jews would prefer to get married outside the auspices of the official Chief Rabbinate. This broad public support, in both Israel and the Diaspora, will hopefully be translated into active support for the battle for freedom of marriage in Israel. The civil political parties sitting in the coalition and the opposition will hopefully cease their reprehensible surrender to the ultra-Orthodox parties and jointly pass a freedom of marriage law in Israel.

A clear message emerged from the Index for Israel's centrist and left-leaning parties, and perhaps also for those on the right, for 38% of the Jewish public said it would likely or very likely vote for a new political party that promotes religious freedom and equality. This includes 54% of secular and 35% of traditional Jews. The heads of all Israeli civil parties should note this striking response; there is no doubt that it is indicative of the public's support for religious freedom and equality of civic burden, and its desire to see a political party pursue these principles with determination and serious commitment. The government coalition parties sell off the public's religious freedoms for a mess of political porridge, and the opposition parties carefully avoid antagonizing the ultra-Orthodox parties, hoping to gain their support in forming a future left-leaning coalition. The 2016 Index should serve as a warning to all of the civil political parties, for the secular public clearly expects them to take a decisive stand and effect positive changes in Israel's religion and state arena.

We have called again and again for the establishment of a civil government without parties that support state empowered religious coercion, which supports the integration of ultra-Orthodox Israelis into the armed forces and labor market, and supports the implementation of core curricular studies in state funded ultra-Orthodox schools. In recent years, 66% of respondents
have consistently expressed their support for a government without the ultra-Orthodox parties, and this crosses political lines. 69% of voters for the civil coalition parties (Likud, Kulanu, Yisrael Beiteinu) and 87% of voters for the opposition parties (The Zionist Union, Yesh Atid, and Meretz) would prefer such a government. Unfortunately, the previous Likud-led government coalition that included Yesh Atid and the Jewish Home fell apart prematurely. That coalition’s limited achievements in matters of religion and state have all been reversed by the current government, and Prime Minister Netanyahu consistently kowtows to the whims of his ultra-Orthodox coalition partners.

None of this was decreed by Heaven. It is possible and necessary to establish a civil government to create the necessary civil revolution in Israel. When the civil political parties finally realize Israel’s urgent need for a civil government, they will be able to pass the necessary pieces of legislation in the realm of religious freedom and civic burden. When this happens (finally, and unfortunately later than it could have been), the promise of Israel’s Declaration of Independence of religious freedom and equality will be realized.

With blessings from Hiddush -
Freedom of religion and equality,

Stanley Gold  
Chairman

Rabbi Uri Regev, Esq.  
CEO
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A revolution: Nearly half of the Jewish Israeli public prefers non-Orthodox weddings

The 2016 Index indicates a dramatic increase in the percentage of respondents who would prefer not to have Orthodox wedding ceremonies for themselves or their children, from 37% in 2015 to 47% this year. Of these, 26% prefer civil marriage, 15% prefer Reform or Conservative weddings, and 6% prefer cohabitation with no official marriage. These responses assume that Israeli law would officially recognize all of these alternatives.
This question is of great importance because it reflects a personal preference, rather than theoretical support for marriage freedom. Opponents of marriage freedom in Israel often claim that if civil marriage were made legal in Israel, most Israelis would still not choose it. The increasing number of Israelis who indicated their preference to get married outside the auspices of the Chief Rabbinate underscores that this argument is becoming less and less true with every passing year.

Only 53%, slightly more than half, are interested in having Orthodox weddings, compared with 63% (nearly two-thirds) in the previous Index.

Among secular Israeli Jews, 78% (i.e. 4 in 5) are not interested in having Orthodox weddings; and among immigrants from the former Soviet Union, 74% do not prefer it. Among non-Haredi Jews (including secular Jews, traditional Jews, and Zionist Orthodox Jews) more than half would prefer not to have Orthodox wedding ceremonies - 52%.

Preferred form of marriage by secular Israeli Jewish respondents
Assuming all forms are recognized by law

- Civil marriage: 45%
- Reform or Conservative Wedding: 21%
- Orthodox wedding: 22%
- Cohabitation without marriage: 12%
- Cohabitation with marriage: 45%
Among traditional Jews, there remains a gap between their principles and their personal preferences: 62% support all forms of marriage, but only 34% (one third) would prefer to get married outside the auspices of the Chief Rabbinate, and 66% (two thirds) prefer Orthodox wedding ceremonies. In this regard, traditional Jews are much like Likud voters. 63% of Likud voters support state recognition of all forms of marriage, but 67% would prefer to have Orthodox weddings for themselves. Among ultra-Orthodox and Zionist Orthodox Jews, nearly 100% prefer to have Orthodox weddings for themselves and their children.
This question has been repeated in every Religion & State Index, and its context is a future reality in which the State of Israel would recognize Orthodox marriages, civil marriages, and religious non-Orthodox marriages (Reform and Conservative) equally. In this Index, we also asked the respondents about their preferences in the current reality, in which the State of Israel only recognizes Orthodox marriages when marriage is performed in Israel, but also recognizes civil marriages when performed abroad.

In the current legal reality, 67% of respondents would prefer to have Orthodox weddings ceremonies for themselves, and 33% would prefer another alternative: 23% (almost one quarter) would choose civil marriages performed abroad (17%) or not having a wedding at all (6%). 10% would prefer a private wedding ceremony unrecognized by the State and not registered by the Interior Ministry. Even given the current reality in which the Chief Rabbinate has a monopoly on State recognized Jewish marriages in Israel, the majority of secular Jews (56%) prefer to forgo Orthodox wedding ceremonies. Notably, among Zionist Orthodox religious moderates a quarter (26%) would prefer weddings outside the auspices of the Chief Rabbinate, 16% of which prefer private weddings in Israel (likely, private Orthodox weddings) not registered via the Chief Rabbinate.

It is important to note that only 16-17% of Jewish marriages registered with the State are performed abroad (most of these are couples with one partner who is not Jewish according to the Orthodox Chief Rabbinate). That is to say, given the Chief Rabbinate’s monopoly, the public's preference for weddings performed outside of the Rabbinate is challenged by counter pressures and considerations such as: the preferences of the couples' relatives, the preference for weddings that are both legal and valid according to traditional Jewish law, the (baseless) concern that alternative weddings will somehow affect the religious status of the children, and the comfort of being "like everyone else."

### Preferred form of alternative marriage

Among the 23% of respondents who would prefer to get married outside the Chief Rabbinate

- **Civil wedding**: 59%
- **Orthodox wedding outside the Rabbinate**: 9%
- **Reform wedding**: 25%
- **Conservative Wedding**: 7%
27% of respondents said they would prefer weddings outside the auspices of the Rabbinate (with or without civil marriages abroad). What kinds of ceremonies? 3 in 5 (59%) would prefer civil wedding ceremonies, much more than those who would prefer non-Orthodox religious ceremonies (Reform and Conservative). 25% would prefer to have Reform weddings, 7% would prefer Conservative weddings, and 9% would prefer Orthodox weddings outside the auspices of the Rabbinate.

As for the fundamental annual Index question measuring public support for official state recognition of all forms of marriage, including Reform, Conservative, civil and Orthodox - it remained high: 66% (last year it was 64%). Among secular Jews, support stands at 90%, and among traditional Jews support stands at 62%. There was a significant difference in support between women and men; 72% of women supported official state recognition of all forms of marriage, versus 59% of men.

Among voters for the civil political parties in Israel’s government coalition, 63% of Likud, 71% of Kulanu, and 83% of Yisrael Beiteinu voters (an average of 69% among all three) expressed their support for State recognition of all forms of marriage. 77% of voters for the ultra-Orthodox parties and the Zionist Orthodox Jewish Home party were opposed. The difference among right leaning and left leaning respondents was large, likely due to the fact that most Orthodox voters identity as right leaning. 55% of right leaning voters are opposed to recognition of all forms of marriage, compared to 85% of centrists and 100% of left leaning voters who support it.
Support for separation of religion and state continues to increase - 63% of the public is in support

As in the past Indices, we measured both support for “Freedom of Religion and Conscience” [taken from the Declaration of Independence] and for separation of religion and state. As we see, in spite of the similarity between the two, different people understand these concepts differently and respond to them differently. Support for the separation of religion and state continues to rise. This year, 63% of respondents voiced their support, compared to 61% in the previous two years, and 55% in most previous surveys. 87% of secular Jews and 76% of immigrants from the former Soviet Union are in support, but 82% of Orthodox respondents are opposed. 98% of Meretz voters, 86% of Zionist Union voters, and 80% of Yesh Atid voters support the separation of religion and state in Israel. Additionally, 33% of Jewish Home voters, 21% of Shas voters, and 15% of United Torah Judaism voters voiced their support. Most likely, these supporters believe that such a separation would be good for religion itself.

Israel’s conflict between the right and left political wings ranked higher than Israel’s Haredi-secular conflict for the second year in a row, among a list of Israel’s most difficult societal tensions. 67% of respondents answered that the political dispute was either the most severe or second most severe; 58% said the same about the religious conflict. In the early years of the Index, the Haredi-secular tensions were ranked the most severe conflict in Israel, as expressed by more than 70% of respondents. The tensions between right leaning and left leaning Israelis ranked second, as expressed by less than 50%. The conflict between the rich and the poor was noted by only 24% of respondents, and the conflict between Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews was noted by 29%.
84% of the Jewish public supports the full realization of religious freedom and conscience in Israel, as promised by its Declaration of Independence. Support for religious freedom has remained stable since 2011, ranging from 83% to 86%. Among secular Jews, 95% are in support, as are 87% of non-Haredi Jews. Nearly half of the ultra-Orthodox population is in support (48%), but this is a decrease from last year (56%). Even among Zionist Orthodox Jews, support fell from 73% to 67%.
The Liberal Streams

55%: We would pray at a pluralistic Kotel plaza

The outgoing year was marked by heightened battles surrounding the matter of granting recognition and equal status to the liberal denominations (Reform and Conservative). Thus, the 2016 Index includes some related questions. The most prominent issue in this area was the Western Wall compromise, which was agreed upon by the government, the liberal streams, and the Women of the Wall. At first, the ultra-Orthodox political parties tacitly agreed to the compromise, but following intense internal pressure they turned their backs to their original consent and replaced it with vehement opposition.

12% of Index respondents affiliated themselves with liberal Judaism - 7% with Reform Judaism, and 5% with Conservative Judaism. This is a considerable increase from last year's Index, in which 9% affiliated themselves with liberal Judaism - 5% with Reform, and 4% with Conservative. On the one hand, affiliating with one of the liberal streams usually does not indicate regular synagogue attendance, congregational membership or paying synagogue dues. On the other hand, the question uses strong wording: "affiliate yourself" rather than “identify with” or “support,” for instance. The fact that 12% of respondents associate themselves with one of the liberal streams indicates their growing acceptance in the public's mind.

66% of the Jewish public supports the Western Wall compromise, which assigns the southern section of the Western Wall area known as Robinson’s Arch as a pluralistic prayer space to be administered jointly with the liberal streams and Women of the Wall. Among secular Jews, 88% support this, but 78% of Zionist Orthodox and 96% of ultra-Orthodox Jews are opposed. Notably, 25% of Reform and Conservative...
Conservative Jews voiced their opposition to the compromise, perhaps because they are loath to give up their rights to pray in a manner that befits their beliefs at the original Western Wall plaza.

Among voters for the non-religious Coalition parties, support for the compromise was fairly high, including 65% of Likud voters, 71% of Kulanu voters, and 79% of Israel Beiteinu voters. In contrast, 84% of voters for the ultra-Orthodox parties are opposed to the compromise, as are 80% of Jewish Home voters. This is despite the support of the Jewish Home party's leaders, not including Minister Uri Ariel, for the agreement.

As with the issue of marriage freedom, Hiddush also added an additional, practical question on the matter of the respondents' personal preferences regarding the Western Wall: "If the Western Wall compromise were to be implemented, allowing for ceremonies, prayers, and visits of men and women together, without separation, in the new prayer plaza, which prayer plaza would you prefer to use?" 45%, less than half of the respondents, answered that they would prefer to use the traditional plaza with the gender separation fence. 34% would prefer the new pluralistic plaza, and 21% responded that they would use both plazas. In total, 55% would use the pluralistic plaza, should the government's agreement with the liberal streams and Women of the Wall be implemented.

Among ultra-Orthodox respondents, 100% would only use the traditional, gender separated plaza, as would 98% of Zionist Orthodox respondents. However, 84% of secular Israelis would use the pluralistic Kotel plaza, including 57% who would use it exclusively and 27% who would make use of both. About half of traditional Jews would only use the traditional plaza with gender segregation (49%), about a
quarter would only use the pluralistic plaza (26%), and a quarter would make use of both. It must be noted, of course, that Orthodox Jews come to the Western Wall more often than secular Jews.

Noteworthy: even those Jews who associate themselves with Reform or Conservative Judaism are divided upon the question of which plaza they would prefer to use. For the past 15 years, the alternative prayer area at Robinson’s Arch was used in a limited capacity, known informally as the Conservative Kotel (formally, it’s known as 'Ezrat Yisrael' - the area for “Israel”). Despite this, 44% of Conservative Jews said they would continue to use the traditional Western Wall prayer plaza, and 40% said they would use both. Only 16% would exclusively use the pluralistic prayer plaza. Among Reform Jews, 41% responded that they would only use the new plaza, 27% would use both plazas, and 32% (a third) would continue to use the traditional plaza.

Among Zionist Orthodox Jews, there was a clear distribution: virtually no Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews or mainstream Zionist Orthodox Jews intend to use the new plaza. However, 42% of moderate Zionist Orthodox Israelis would use the pluralistic plaza - 11% would use it exclusively, and 31% would make use of both plazas.

64% of respondents, nearly two-thirds, believe Israel should grant equal status to the three major streams of Judaism - Orthodox, Conservative and Reform. 36% oppose this. This question was only asked once before in the Religion & State Index in 2009. That year, 63% supported granting equal status to all of the major streams, indicating consistent, stable support for this issue. 90% of secular Jews expressed their support, but 90% of Zionist Orthodox Jews and 94% of ultra-Orthodox Jews are opposed. Among those who lean left politically, 100% support equal status for the streams, as do 85% of political centrists, but support drops to 40% on the right.
Support for equal recognition of the 3 largest religious streams in Judaism by religiosity

Opposition to equal recognition of the 3 largest religious streams in Judaism by subcategories in the Zionist Orthodox sector
81% support ending the Chief Rabbinate's monopoly on kashrut certification

In the arena of kashrut, support for abolishing the Chief Rabbinate’s monopoly has increasingly become a matter of broad public consensus. 81% of the Jewish public favors opening the kashrut certification market to competition and eliminating the Rabbinate's monopoly. 52% support opening the kashrut certification market to competition from all streams of Judaism, and 29% support opening the market to competition from exclusively Orthodox institutions.

Therefore, it seems that the High Court's decision to interpret the law as granting the Chief Rabbinate's a monopoly on the use of the word "kosher," as well as on all words synonymous with or alluding to “kosher,” has not led the public to trust the Rabbinate any further. Among secular Jews, 95% support opening the kashrut certification market, including 80% who would like to see it opened to the non-Orthodox streams. 88% of traditional Jews also favor abolishing the Rabbinate’s monopoly. Another interesting survey result is the 60% level of support among Zionist Orthodox Jews for opening the kashrut market and dissolving the Rabbinate’s monopoly, but the majority of these (55%) favor opening the market only to exclusively Orthodox organizations. Even 41% of Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews are in favor of ending the Rabbinate's kashrut monopoly.

Support opening the kashrut certification market to competition by religiosity

![Chart showing support by religiosity](chart.png)

- Open to all streams
- Open only to Orthodoxy
Support opening the kashrut certification market to competition
by coalition / opposition

Coalition - Orthodox parties: 53%
Coalition - civil parties: 86%
Opposition: 98%
Support for public transport on Shabbat continues to rise, reaching 73%

Support for the operation of public transportation on Shabbat continues to rise steadily. 73% of the Jewish public supports operation on a full scale (23%) or at least on a limited scale (50%). This is in comparison to 70% in 2014, 64% in 2013, and 58% in 2010. Among non-Haredi Jews support reaches 79%, among secular Jews it is 96%, and among traditional Jews it stands at 71%.

100% of Meretz voters support the operation of public transportation on Shabbat, as do 95% of Yesh Atid and 93% of Zionist Union voters. Even among voters for the civil coalition parties, support is fairly high: Likud - 74%, Yisrael Beiteinu - 90%, Kulanu - 86%. Even a third of Zionist Orthodox Jews support this measure (all of these favor operation on a limited scale). Among Zionist Orthodox moderates, support reaches 63% (almost two-thirds), among mainstream Zionist Orthodox Jews - 33% (one-third), and among Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews - 20%.
Presumably, support for public transport on Shabbat is so high due to two main factors: 1) A compromise solution is available, allowing for operation of public transportation on a limited scale and possibly on smaller service vehicles. Partial operation of transport on Shabbat received more than twice the public support received by full operation of public transport on Shabbat. 2) The Israeli public is aware of the clear social context for this particular religion-state battle, which most disadvantages those who cannot drive or afford their own vehicles: the poor, the elderly, the young, and some with special needs.
Over the years, several initiatives have been attempted to create a new status quo on Shabbat. The latest is a proposed Shabbat bill from 4 Members of Knesset from both the Coalition and the Opposition. The essence of the proposal is: secular Jews would give up large scale commerce on Shabbat, and Orthodox Jews would agree to allow for cultural events and entertainment on Shabbat, as well as the operation of restaurants, cafes and small convenience stores, which already exist in quite a few places. Additionally, public transport would be permitted on a limited scale.

Unfortunately, support for these initiatives is lower than one might expect. Only 57% voiced their support, only 37% of which are strongly supportive. 43% are opposed. It seems that this slight majority of public support for these compromises is due to a resistance found across all sectors. 94% of ultra-Orthodox Jews and 70% of Zionist Orthodox Jews are opposed, despite the fact that many of those who propose such initiatives are themselves Sabbath observant. Some 65% of secular and traditional Jews (nearly two-thirds) support such initiatives, but one-third of these sectors remain opposed. Among Zionist Orthodox Jews, 63% of moderates expressed their support, but 64% of mainstream Zionist Orthodox Jews and 85% of Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews were opposed.

Support for a Shabbat compromise by Zionist Orthodox sector subcategories

![Chart showing support for Shabbat compromises by Zionist Orthodox subcategories.]

- 63% Moderate Zionist Orthodox
- 36% Mainstream Zionist Orthodox
- 15% Zionist ultra-Orthodox
The political system

More than 60% of voters for the centrist parties: we would likely vote for a new political party that promotes religious freedom

67% of Yesh Atid and 61% of Zionist Union voters said that if a new, centrist party were to be founded with the primary goal of fighting against religious coercion and for equality of civic burden, there would be a very high likelihood that they would vote for it.

Likelihood you would vote for a new "religious freedom" political party by vote in the last Knesset elections

Overall, 54% of secular Jews, 42% of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, and 35% of traditional Jews responded that they would be likely or very likely to vote for a newly established "religious freedom" party. Among the general Jewish population, 38% responded that there was a very high chance (17%) or somewhat high chance (21%) that they would vote for such a party.
17% of all Jewish voters responded "very likely." This level of support would translate into 16-18 seats in the Knesset. Still, this particular question is very theoretical. Firstly, the question didn't make mention of any alternative parties; secondly, the language of the question specified that this hypothetical party was projected to pass the electoral threshold. In other words, for a new party to actualize even a small amount of its projected potential, it must show at least a 3-4% level of public support in pre-election surveys, since the threshold in the Knesset elections is now 3.25%. Experience shows that this is no simple thing for new political parties. Still, the Index results suggest that the public desires a party to represent its interests in matters of religion and equality of civic burden. It is also possible to reach this conclusion based upon the increased public support for such a party, compared to 35% in 2010 - before the establishment of the ostensibly anti-religious coercion political party Yesh Atid.

A few more interesting facts: 44% of women, compared to 32% of men, said they would be likely to vote for a "religious freedom" party. 58% of centrist voters but only 45% of left leaning voters expressed their support, which is likely due to the relatively high level of loyalty exhibited by Meretz voters - only 39% of them would consider voting for such a new party, compared to more than 60% of Yesh Atid and Zionist Union voters. However, it is also important to note that Meretz currently only has 5 seats in the Knesset, meaning that the loss of a single seat could jeopardize its passing the threshold and entering the Knesset.

81% expressed their dissatisfaction with the government’s actions in the realm of religion and state. This is a slight increase of one percent compared to last year and an increase of 5% compared to July 2013 (at the beginning of the Likud-Yesh Atid government). The high rate of dissatisfaction cuts across all sectors. 92% of secular Jews, 73% of traditional Jews, 59% of Zionist Orthodox Jews, and 61% of ultra-Orthodox Jews expressed their dissatisfaction in this regard. It seems the rift on religion-state matters in Israel is so deep, and attempts to bridge it are so few, that all religious sectors of the Jewish population remain constantly frustrated by the government’s actions or its inaction on related matters.
That said, 39% of ultra-Orthodox Jews are satisfied with the government’s actions on matters of religion and state. This may not seem like a lot, but this is an increase from last year’s Index when only 19% of ultra-Orthodox Jews were satisfied. It would appear that this government’s surrender to the demands of the ultra-Orthodox parties, such as undoing Yesh Atid’s IDF Draft Law, exempting state funded ultra-Orthodox schools from teaching core curricular studies, and increasing government funding for yeshivas, all affected the ultra-Orthodox public’s level of satisfaction with the government. Of all the parties, only among Shas voters did a majority expressed their satisfaction in this regard (52%). 45% (less than half) of United Torah Judaism voters expressed their satisfaction.

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**Dissatisfied with the government's actions in the realm of religion and state by vote in the last Knesset elections - Coalition parties**

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<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>Likud</td>
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<td>Kulanu</td>
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<td>Yisrael Beiteinu</td>
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<td>Jewish Home</td>
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**Dissatisfied with the government's activities in the realm of religion and state by religiosity**

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<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zionist Orthodox</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultra-Orthodox</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Further findings indicate that this dissatisfaction with the government's activities in the realm of religion and state crosses the political spectrum: 100% of left leaning voters are dissatisfied, as are 68% of right leaning voters. 96% of voters for the opposition parties are dissatisfied, and so too are 74% of voters for the civic coalition parties (including 90% of Yisrael Beiteinu voters).
66% of respondents favor a government without the ultra-Orthodox parties - a stable finding in recent years. This includes 88% of secular Jews, 80% of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, and 66% of traditional Jews. Support among traditional Jews rose from 54% last year to 66% in this year’s Index. In contrast, 70% of Zionist Orthodox and 96% of ultra-Orthodox Jews are opposed to such a government coalition. 69% of voters for the civil coalition parties are supportive of a government without the ultra-Orthodox parties, but the very parties that they voted for sit in the coalition together with Shas and United Torah Judaism and submit to their demands! 87% of Shas voters and 100% of United Torah Judaism voters are opposed to having a government coalition without these parties [Namely, a government that would leave them out].
72% of the public: deny funding to state funded ultra-Orthodox schools that refuse to teach core curricular subjects.

The Index survey was conducted in the midst of a period during which the law to exempt state funded ultra-Orthodox schools from teaching core curricular studies was being debated. 82% of the Jewish population favors requiring state funded ultra-Orthodox schools to teach mathematics, English, science and civics. This issue has garnered a slow but steady increase in public support: 79% in 2013, 81% in 2014, and 82% in each of the last two years.

Among secular Jews and immigrants from the former Soviet Union, some 95% support mandating core curricular studies for state funded ultra-Orthodox schools; 89% of traditional Jews and 60% of Zionist Orthodox Jews also support this. Interesting: even 14% of ultra-Orthodox respondents and 29% of Shas party voters support requiring this.

Among voters for the coalition parties, 86% of Likud voters, 91% of Kulanu and Yisrael Beiteinu voters, and 70% of Jewish Home voters support making core curricular studies mandatory for ultra-Orthodox schools that receive state funding. Among opposition party voters, support ranged from 95% (Meretz) to 99% (Yesh Atid).

The second question related to core curricular studies deals with enforcement. The percentage of respondents who support denying government funds to schools that refuse to teach core curricular studies rose from 57% in 2012 to 66% last year and 72% in this year’s Index.
Among these 72%, 42% favor denying government funds, and 30% favor denying funds and also changing the law, such that operating state funded schools that refuse to teach core curricular studies would be considered a criminal offense, punishable by heavy fines. Only 28% believe that the current reality should be perpetuated (i.e. providing government funds to schools that don’t teach the core curriculum), or that the state should not enforce the core curriculum at all. It would seem that the Knesset’s passing of the core curriculum exemption law for state funded ultra-Orthodox schools resulted in a significant public backlash.

The correct way to enforce core curricular studies for state funded ultra-Orthodox schools

- Withhold funding and instate fines: 30%
- Withhold funding: 42%
- Give partial funding: 28%
- Don’t enforce: 16%
Among secular Jews, 89% support withholding funding from schools that refuse to implement the core curriculum, as do 83% of immigrants from the former Soviet Union and 69% of traditional Jews. 100% of ultra-Orthodox Jews and 55% of Zionist Orthodox Jews oppose such sanctions. And what about voters for the civic coalition parties that voted to exempt these ultra-Orthodox schools? 76% of Likud voters, and 88% of Kulanu and Yisrael Beiteinu voters favor economic sanctions against such schools that don't teach English, mathematics, science and civics; but contrary to their voters' values, these parties allowed the law to pass.

68% of secular Jews and immigrants from the former Soviet Union support the establishment of a secular educational council like a Public School Board of Education. This would aim to protect the state education curriculum for secular schools from becoming increasingly religious. Among the general public, 51% support the establishment of such a council and 49% oppose it. Traditional Jews are divided 50-50, and 91% of Zionist Orthodox and 87% of ultra-Orthodox Jews are opposed.
Yeshiva funding and integration of ultra-Orthodox men into society

The Israeli Jewish public says: significantly reduce the number of ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students

The government budget for yeshivas was doubled this year, compared to its 2014 level. 79% of the Jewish population and 86% of the non-Haredi Jewish population favor cancelling this budget (39%) or at least cutting it down to a quarter or half of its current size (40%). 10% believe that it should be left as it is, and 11% favor increasing it as much as possible. 96% of secular Jews support cancelling or decreasing the budget for yeshivas, as do 84% of traditional Jews.

So what do the voters for the coalition parties think about the government's funding for yeshivas? 81% of Likud voters support cancelling the budget or reducing it significantly, as do 95% of Kulanu and Yisrael Beiteinu voters. Among Jewish Home party voters, 60% support reducing or cancelling this budget. Still, 93% of Shas voters favor increasing the budget for yeshivas as much as possible, as do 56% of United Torah Judaism voters (44% of UTJ voters favor leaving it as it is).
Today, 50% of Israel’s male ultra-Orthodox population studies in yeshivas instead of entering the workforce. 79% of the Jewish public believes that this should be reduced to one-third (10%) or one-tenth of ultra-Orthodox men (32%), or that all ultra-Orthodox men should enter the workforce (37%). 21% favor maintaining the current reality in which half of all ultra-Orthodox men study in yeshivas instead of working (7%) or even increasing the number of yeshiva students (14%).
Among secular Jews 90% believe that the number of ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students should be significantly reduced, as do 80% of traditional Jews. Among Zionist Orthodox Jews 66% support this measure, and most of them (51%) support only having 10% of Israel's ultra-Orthodox male population studying in yeshivas. Still, 60% of ultra-Orthodox respondents support increasing the number of ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students as much as possible, and 28% support maintaining the current situation. 79% of voters for the civic coalition parties support significantly decreasing the number of ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students, but 85% of voters for the ultra-Orthodox parties oppose this.

When the Yesh Atid party was in the previous government coalition, it succeeded in giving priority to individuals in the workforce or seeking work in relation to government benefits for daycare and housing. As anticipated, the current government cancelled these decisions; but 83% of respondents believe the government should indeed give priority to those who realize their earning capacity and who are in the workforce or seeking employment. Only 17% maintain that this shouldn't be a government priority.

This is a very stable response to the question, which has been asked in various versions in 4 different Indices. Support for making government benefits conditional upon being employed or seeking work has ranged from 80% - 83%. This position enjoys very broad social consensus; 86% of secular Jews, 89% of traditional Jews, and 83% of Zionist Orthodox Jews favor this. Even among ultra-Orthodox Jews, 43% expressed their support (57% are opposed).
What about the coalition party voters? 90% of Likud voters, 81% of Yisrael Beiteinu, 84% of Kulanu voters, and 81% of Jewish Home voters favor making government benefits conditional upon being employed or seeking employment. Even 52% of United Torah Judaism and 56% of Shas voters support this, which is a significant increase. In the previous Index, only 38% of voters for the ultra-Orthodox parties were in favor. Likely, those ultra-Orthodox respondents who favor the government giving priority to those seeking employment or in the workforce have jobs themselves. In recent years, the number of employed ultra-Orthodox Israelis has been increasing - half of ultra-Orthodox men and more than 70% of ultra-Orthodox women are currently employed.
68% of the Jewish public favors cancelling all government funding for programs that promote Orthodox Judaism to non-Orthodox Jews and are deemed by many as intended to increase the phenomenon of “born again Jews” (43%), or at least to significantly reduce this funding (25%). 31% support maintaining these funding levels, and 19% favor increasing them. 91% of secular Jews support reducing government funding for programs that promote Orthodox Judaism, as do 85% of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, and 71% of traditional Jews. 100% of the ultra-Orthodox favor maintaining the current levels of support (17%) or increasing these allocated funds (83%). Even 80% of Zionist Orthodox Jews favor maintaining the current support or increasing funding levels for these programs. Among voters for the civil coalition parties, 71% favor cancelling these government funds or at least significantly reducing them, as do 94% of voters for the opposition parties.
Despite decreased public discourse, 83% favor compulsory civic service for yeshiva students

The political system, including the Yesh Atid party, is behaving as though it has lost all interest in recruiting yeshiva students into Israel's army. The Knesset passed a law abolishing the sanctions on yeshiva students who choose not to enlist without any fierce public debate whatsoever.

This political move, demanded by the ultra-Orthodox parties in their Coalition agreements, is utterly disconnected from the Israeli public's stance. 83% of the Jewish population and 91% of non-Haredi respondents believe that ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students, or most of them, should do military or civic service. These findings of our surveys have been consistent ever since the question was first asked in 2010, and support has ranged from 80% (2010) to 87% (2011). Among immigrants from the former Soviet Union, support is particular high - 93%. Among the general population, only 28% believe that all yeshiva students should be conscripted into the military, compared to 44% of secular Jews and 50% of immigrants.

98% of those who identify themselves as politically left leaning support mandatory service for the majority of yeshiva students (42% of which favor military service for all yeshiva students), as do 95% of Meretz voters. This position is in stark contrast to the government’s actions, which has waived mandatory service for yeshiva students. 99% of Yesh Atid voters favor obligatory service for most or all yeshiva students. What about those who voted for the civil coalition parties? 83% of Likud voters support making military or civic service compulsory for all or most yeshiva students, as do 100% of Kulanu voters and 96% of Yisrael Beiteinu voters.
Zionist Orthodox Israelis:

Support for equality of civic burden and integrating ultra-Orthodox Jews, but less so for religious freedom

In recent years, Israel's Zionist Orthodox sector of society has effectively divided into three: religious moderates/liberals, mainstream Zionist Orthodox, and Zionist ultra-Orthodox. The 2016 Index used an expanded sample of Zionist Orthodox Jews in order to provide more reliable and detailed measuring of this sector's public positions, broken down into these three sub-groups, and allowing for deeper analysis.

An interesting distinction was revealed between the positions held by the factions of the Zionist Orthodox community on equality of civic burden and integration into the workforce on the one hand and matters of religious freedom on the other. When it comes to matters of integrating ultra-Orthodox Jews (for example: core curricular studies and government funding for yeshivas), most Zionist Orthodox Jews (including both those who are mainstream and those who are moderates) responded much like the traditional and secular sectors of society. Likely, these issues are considered significant for securing the future of Israel and Zionism. Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews, on the other hand, are more similar to the ultra-Orthodox community's positions when it comes to these issues.

Still, on matters of religious freedom the majority of the Zionist Orthodox sector is more conservative. Even among Zionist Orthodox moderates, approximately half of the respondents expressed their opposition on religious freedom issues such as recognizing all forms of marriage (including Reform and Conservative). The Zionist ultra-Orthodox, in general, took positions much like those of the ultra-Orthodox. Mainstream Zionist Orthodox Jews responded more similarly to the Zionist ultra-Orthodox than the Zionist Orthodox moderates on matters of religious freedom. This year was marked by widespread religious struggles related to the Reform and Conservative streams, and several Index questions dealt with this. Likely, the negative attitude towards recognition of the liberal religious streams was affected by this; it's possible that questions related to secular Israelis would have received greater levels of approval.

As noted, on matters of equality of civic burden and government funds for yeshivas, the mainstream Zionist Orthodox community responded similarly to the Zionist Orthodox moderates, and unlike the Zionist ultra-Orthodox respondents. 79% of moderates favor obligatory service for most yeshiva students, as do 75% of mainstream Zionist Orthodox Jews, but 63% of Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews support the current state of affairs, which allows most ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students not to serve the State of Israel via military or civil service.

60% of Zionist Orthodox moderates and 50% of mainstream Zionist Orthodox Israelis support cancelling or reducing the governmental funding for yeshivas, but 88% of Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews believe the
current this budget should remain as it is or be increased. Similarly, 81% of moderates and 70% of the Zionist Orthodox mainstream support requiring core curricular studies of all state funded ultra-Orthodox schools, but 69% of Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews object. 53% of Zionist Orthodox moderates and members of the mainstream favor sanctions against ultra-Orthodox schools that refuse to teach the core curriculum, but 93% of Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews object to this.

The question of whether freedom of religion and conscience should be realized in Israel is among the questions found in every annual Index. Responses to this question have not varied much throughout the years; 84% of the public supports this. Still, among Zionist Orthodox Jews the 2016 Index revealed significant gaps - 95% of religious moderates expressed their support for freedom of religion and conscience, compared to 62% of mainstream Zionist Orthodox Israelis and 53% of Zionist ultra-Orthodox Israelis. The Zionist ultra-Orthodox responded much like the ultra-Orthodox (52% of whom support the realization of freedom of religion and conscience).

The fact that on matters of religious freedom the mainstream Zionist Orthodox community is more similar in outlook to the Zionist ultra-Orthodox community than the moderate Zionist Orthodox community was demonstrated in their responses to the question regarding which Western Wall plaza they would make use of, if the pluralistic plaza were established at Robinson's Arch. Almost no Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews or mainstream Zionist Orthodox Jews intend to use the pluralistic Kotel plaza. However, 42% of moderate Zionist Orthodox Jews intend to use the new plaza. Of these, 11% would only use the pluralistic plaza, and 31% would make use of both plazas.

In terms of how they relate to Reform/Conservative Jews, the mainstream Zionist Orthodox respondents are much like Zionist ultra-Orthodox respondents. 42% of moderate Zionist Orthodox Jews support
granting equal status of all of the major streams of Judaism in Israel, but 90% of mainstream Zionist Orthodox and Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews oppose this.

2016 Israel Religion and State Index – background information

The Israel Religion & State Index is an annual public opinion study conducted by the Smith Polling Institute for Hiddush - Freedom of Religion for Israel, Inc. The Index tracks public opinion on issues of religion and state in Israel to serve as a tool for policymakers, the media, researchers, NGOs, and the general public in Israel and in the Diaspora. The 2016 Index is based on a sample of 700 adult (aged 18 and over) Jewish Israelis, of which the representative sample is 600 people, and an additional 100 were added, expanding the sample of the Zionist Orthodox sector to allow for deeper understanding and more accurate analysis. The Index survey was conducted by telephone from July 25-27, 2016. The margin of error is 4%.

The Religion & State Index project was launched 7 years ago, and this is the ninth Index study published by Hiddush. In the summer of 2009, with the establishment of Hiddush, the preparatory Religion & State Index was conducted. The first two Index surveys were conducted during the winter and summer of 2010. It was then decided to shift from semi-annual to an annual study, published every year on the eve of Rosh Hashana.

The 2016 Index included 25 content questions and an additional 13 background questions. Of the content questions, 11 were annual Index questions that were asked in all Indices (or almost all), 8 new questions, and 6 that were asked in the past, but not every year. Results for questions that were asked in other years were compared to previous survey results. The new questions primarily relate to the new coalition agreements signed between Likud and the ultra-Orthodox parties, matters of marriage freedom and the Western Wall compromise that was reached between the government, the Women of the Wall, and the Reform and Conservative movements.

The respondents were broken down according to 7 background variables (religiosity, natives & immigrants, vote in the last Knesset elections, age, country of origin, political worldview, and gender). The three most important variables were religiosity, vote in the last Knesset elections, and political worldview. The distribution of the core sample of the adult Jewish population according to religiosity was as follows: 48% of the respondents were secular, 16% were "traditional - not very religious," 15% were “traditional – religious,” 12% were Zionist Orthodox, and 9% were ultra-Orthodox. In the analysis, when relevant, we grouped the traditional Jews as one category. Native born Israelis represented 85% of the respondents, and immigrants who arrived in 1989 from the former Soviet Union accounted for 15%. In regard to certain questions, the analysis also accounted for affiliation with the liberal religious streams (Reform and Conservative).

The distribution of respondents according to political worldview was as follows: very right wing and right wing - 38%; right leaning centrist - 21%; centrist - 21%; left leaning centrist - 11%; left wing and very left wing - 9%. Using the breakdown of respondents according to their votes in the last elections, we also created a group of respondents who voted for the civil coalition parties (Likud, Kulanu, and Yisrael
Beiteinu), a group for those who voted for the Orthodox coalition parties (Shas, United Torah Judaism, and the Jewish Home), and a group for those who voted for the opposition parties (the Zionist Union and Meretz). Please note: the sample sizes for voters for the small political parties are small so they must only be considered as indications of trends, rather than firm data.

For the 2016 Index, we increased the sample size of the Zionist Orthodox community in order to delve deeper into their views, and we dedicated a special chapter to this in the report. The Zionist Orthodox community was broken down into 3 demographic subcategories: Zionist Orthodox liberal/moderate, mainstream Zionist Orthodox, and Zionist ultra-Orthodox.
1. (annual question) In Israeli Jewish society, tensions and conflicts are many. Among the following, which seem the most severe to you?
   1. Between Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jews
   2. Between those who are politically right wing and left wing
   3. Between ultra-Orthodox and secular Jews
   4. Between immigrants to Israel and native born Israelis
   5. Between the rich and the poor
   6. Other (write) __________
   7. None of these / no opinion

2. (annual question) And what is the second [most severe]? (same list as question 1.)

3. (annual question) Do you agree or disagree that freedom of religion and conscience should be actualized in Israel, that is to say, the freedom for secular and religious Jews to choose how they act based upon their worldviews?
   1. Greatly agree
   2. Somewhat agree
   3. Somewhat disagree
   4. Greatly Disagree
   5. No opinion

4. (annual question) Do you support or oppose separation of religion and state in Israel?
   1. Greatly support
   2. Somewhat support
   3. Somewhat oppose
   4. Greatly oppose
   5. No opinion

Block of questions on marriage & divorce:

5. (annual question) In the present day, Jewish marriage and divorce in Israel is only conducted according to Orthodox Jewish law. Do you support or oppose Israel officially recognizing all forms of marriage, including Conservative, Reform, and Civil?
   1. Greatly support
   2. Somewhat support
   3. Somewhat oppose
   4. מתנגד(ת) לא להקריא
   5. אין דעה (לא להקריא)
6. If you or one of your children wanted to get married - what form of marriage would you choose (assuming all the options were legally recognized in Israel):
   1. Orthodox
   2. Conservative or Reform
   3. Civil marriage
   4. Cohabitation without official marriage
   5. No opinion

7. (new question) In Israel there exist a number of marriage alternatives to the Chief Rabbinate, for example: civil marriage outside of Israel and unofficial wedding ceremonies in Israel. Given the existing legal reality, if you or one of your children wanted to get married - what form of marriage would you choose?
   1. Marriage through the Chief Rabbinate
   2. Civil marriage abroad without a wedding in Israel
   3. Civil marriage abroad and a wedding in Israel outside the Rabbinate’s auspices
   4. A legally unrecognized wedding in Israel outside the Rabbinate’s auspices
   5. No opinion

8. (new question) For those who want a wedding outside the Rabbinate’s auspices (responded 3 or 4 to the question above)
   What kind of ceremony outside of the Rabbinate’s auspices would you prefer?
   1. Orthodox, outside the Rabbinate’s auspices
   2. Conservative
   3. Reform
   4. Secular
   5. No opinion

Block of questions on the Western Wall compromise

9. Do you agree or disagree that the three largest Jewish streams should have equal standing in Israel - Orthodox, Conservative, Reform?
   1. Greatly agree
   2. Somewhat agree
   3. Somewhat disagree
   4. Greatly disagree
   5. No opinion

10. (new question) The Western Wall Compromise designates the Western Wall in the area of Robinson's Arch to be administered by the Reform and Conservative streams for pluralistic prayer. Ultra-Orthodox authorities are opposed to the Compromise out of concern that it grants official recognition to the liberal streams. Do you support or oppose the Western Wall Compromise?
    1. Greatly support
    2. Somewhat support
    3. Somewhat oppose
    4. Greatly oppose
    5. No opinion
11. (new question) If the Western Wall Compromise is implemented, allowing for prayers and visits by men and women with no separation between them in the new Western Wall plaza, which plaza would you prefer to visit and make use of?
   1. The traditional plaza with a divider between the sexes
   2. The new pluralistic plaza
   3. Both
   4. I don’t go to the Western Wall
   5. No opinion

Block of questions on Kashrut and Shabbat

12. There has been a broad public discourse surrounding the initiative to grant restaurants private kashrut certification without the involvement of the Chief Rabbinate. What form of kashrut certification would you support?
   1. Maintaining the Chief Rabbinate’s monopoly
   2. Opening the kashrut regulation market to competition among Orthodox authorities, with the state acting as a regulator
   3. Opening the kashrut regulation market to competition among all professional authorities of all Jewish streams, with the state acting as a regulator.
   4. No opinion

13. (new question) A number of Shabbat compromise initiatives have arisen. They aim to formalize into law the current status quo as it relates to entertainment, culture, restaurants, and convenience stores that operate on Shabbat. Public transportation would also be operated on a partial scale. In exchange, shopping centers would be closed on Shabbat. What is your position on these initiatives?
   1. Greatly support
   2. Somewhat support
   3. Somewhat oppose
   4. Greatly oppose
   5. No opinion

14. (previous indices) There exists a public debate over whether or not to operate public transport on Shabbat. Which alternative should the government implement?
   1. The situation should remain as it is (with almost no public transport on Shabbat)
   2. Even the public transport on Shabbat that is currently available should be cancelled.
   3. Public transport on Shabbat should be operated on a limited basis (only on central bus lines and less frequently. Maybe on small service vehicles)
   4. Public transport on Shabbat should be operated on a full scale, just like it is during the work week.
   5. No opinion
Block of questions on the Conscription Law and funding

15. **(annual question with adjustments)** Approximately 15% of those eligible to enlist join yeshivas and most of these do not serve in the IDF. Which of the following reflects your opinion?
   1. It is acceptable to me because “Torah is their service”
   2. Yeshiva students should at least be obligated to civic service
   3. A limit should be set, and the remainder should be obligated to enlist
   4. All of them should enlist and do the full regular service
   5. Refuse to answer
   6. No opinion

16. **(from the 2011 Index, with minor changes)** In Israel, approximately 130,000 yeshiva students aged 18 years and older are not in the workforce. The government budget for yeshivas stands at approximately a one billion NIS. What is your opinion?
   1. The budget should be entirely cancelled
   2. The budget should be cut down to a quarter
   3. The budget should be cut down to half
   4. The budget should be maintained as it is now
   5. The budget should be increased as much as possible
   6. No opinion

17. **(new question)** 50% of ultra-Orthodox men learn in yeshivas and do not work. In your opinion, what percentage of ultra-Orthodox men should be yeshiva students?
   1. As many as possible up to 100%
   2. 50%
   3. 33%
   4. 10%
   5. None
   6. No opinion

18. **(asked previously, with changes)** The government grants priority for some government benefits to those who are working or seeking work - those who are striving to actualize their earning potential. The ultra-Orthodox political parties oppose making government benefits conditional upon striving to actualize one’s earning potential because this is hard for full-time yeshiva students. What is your opinion?
   1. Priority should be granted to those who are working or seeking work
   2. Priority should not be granted to those who are working or seeking work
   3. No opinion

19. **(new question)** The State of Israel funds a number of Jewish evangelical institutions that promote Orthodox Judaism to Jews. These receive their funds from a few different budgets in the realms of education and culture. What is your opinion?
   1. Government funding should be cancelled for these programs
   2. Government funding should be reduced
   3. Government funding should be maintained as it is now
   4. Government funding should be increased as much as possible
   5. No opinion
Block of questions on education

20. (new question) Some claim that it is necessary to protect the state curriculum in secular schools from programs of a religious nature. They would establish an educational council for secular schools, similar to the one that exists for Zionist Orthodox schools. Do you support or oppose establishing such a council for secular state schools?
   1. Greatly support
   2. Somewhat support
   3. Somewhat oppose
   4. Greatly oppose
   5. No opinion

(background information) The previous government passed resolutions to reduce the funding for state funded ultra-Orthodox primary schools, which do not teach core curricular studies. However, that government did not have enough time to implement these resolutions. The current government intends to pass a law to permit state funded ultra-Orthodox to not teach core curricular studies.

21. (annual question in the last few indices) In your opinion, should state funded ultra-Orthodox schools be mandated to teach the core curriculum, including mathematics, English, science, and civics?
   1. They should be mandated
   2. They should not be mandated
   3. No opinion

22. (annual question in the last few indices) In your opinion, how should the implementation of core curricular studies in state funded ultra-Orthodox schools be enforced?
   1. Deny funding to schools that don’t teach the core curriculum
   2. Deny funding and make the absence of core curricular studies an offense punishable by high fines
   3. Give partial funding to schools that don’t teach the core curriculum, as is done today
   4. Don’t enforce core curricular studies
   5. No opinion

Block of questions on politics

Intro: Israel’s political system deals with a long list of religion-state matters such as conversion, marriage, military exemptions for yeshiva students, budgets for yeshivas, and more.

23. (annual question in the last few indices) To what degree are you satisfied with the government's activities in matters of religion and state?
   1. Very satisfied
   2. Somewhat satisfied
   3. Somewhat dissatisfied
   4. Very dissatisfied
   5. No opinion
The ultra-Orthodox political parties have been partners in most of the government coalitions of the last few decades, and have enjoyed great influence in matters of religion-state. They are partners in the current government. Do you support or oppose having a government without the ultra-Orthodox political parties?

1. Greatly support
2. Somewhat support
3. Somewhat oppose
4. Greatly oppose
5. No opinion

If a new political party were to arise that focused on the battle for religious freedom and equality of civic burden, as well as the battle against religious coercion; and it was projected to pass the electoral threshold, with what likelihood would you vote for it?

1. High likelihood
2. Somewhat high likelihood
3. Some likelihood, but not much
4. Low likelihood
5. Almost no likelihood

Block of background questions

26. gender
27. age
28. religiosity (secular, traditional, Zionist Orthodox, ultra-Orthodox)
29. Country of origin and number of years in Israel for immigrants from the FSU
30. Education level
31. Number of children under age 18
32. What stream of Judaism do you affiliate yourself with?
    1. Ultra-Orthodox
    2. Zionist ultra-Orthodox
    3. Zionist Orthodox
    4. Conservative
    5. Reform
    6. Other, write it in ------
    7. Unaffiliated with any religious stream
33. Do you religious observe Shabbat?
    1. Yes, according to traditional Jewish law
    2. Partially observe Shabbat (for example: light candles or recite the sanctification)
    3. Don’t observe, but relate to Shabbat as a special day of rest
    4. A regular rest day, like all days
    5. No opinion
34. Vote in the 2015 Knesset elections
35. Political inclination; and who would you vote for today?
36. Political worldview
37. Income level
38. Place of residence