

2020 Israel Religion & State Index

Abridged Report - Religion & State Through the Lens of the Data

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Hiddush – Freedom of Religion for Israel

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Dear Readers,

We are proud to present you with Hiddush's twelfth annual Israel Religion & State Index. The pride and satisfaction are twofold. Firstly, in that we are once again producing a unique survey unparalleled in its scope, continuity, and depth of exploration in all major Israeli religion-state issues. Secondly, in that the Index once again confirms our assertion that the overwhelming majority of the public supports the advancement of religious freedom and equality, in the spirit of the Israeli Declaration of Independence's promise and of the most basic democratic principles.

This Index is published during a turbulent time in Israel's history, in which the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and its severe impact upon the economy and society are interlaced with the strife-laden and unstable political system. Still, even at such a complex time, issues of religion & state remain prime on the public and political agenda. Many of these are erupting precisely on account of the pandemic and the political reality.

Such is the societal tension caused by the conduct of Israel's ultra-Orthodox sector in facing the pandemic, exacerbated by it being able to dictate to the whole country rules and exceptions by exerting political pressure and threats; such is the case with the nearing deadline set by the Supreme Court regarding the revocation of the unconstitutional Draft Law, resulting with great pressure from the ultra-Orthodox to adopt a new law to ensure that no yeshiva student shall be obligated to perform military or civilian service. Such legislation would undoubtedly be challenged again in court, including by Hiddush, for its unconstitutionality is self-evident; such is the case with the battle over the national budget and its many clauses dealing with funding for yeshivas and other expenditures demanded by the religious parties; Such is the case with the attempt to amend the Law of Return in order to restrict Aliyah of descendants of Jews who are not halakhically Jewish; Such is the case with the continuing Shabbat wars; etc., etc.

The Index provides valuable insights regarding pluralism and the Israel-Diaspora relationship. Not only does it reaffirm that the clear majority of Israel's adult Jewish population supports granting equal status for all Jewish denominations, but it also demonstrates that areas under the Chief Rabbinate's monopoly are resented by most Israeli Jews, and that there is majority support for active engagement of Diaspora Jewry in advocating for religious freedom and equality in Israel.

A consistent majority welcomes Diaspora Jewish leadership's active engagement on such issues as allowing freedom of choice in marriage by instituting civil marriage & divorce and ending the Chief Rabbinate's control over kashrut. This consistent finding is particularly important at a time when Israeli political leaders, whether from the Likud or the ultra-Orthodox parties, repeatedly assault the Diaspora's Jewish pluralism, reject its legitimacy, and fight against pluralism, such as in regards to the Western Wall plaza, conversion, and marriage. Often Diaspora Jewish leadership avoids playing an active role in advocating, together with Israeli partners, for pluralism and religious freedom in Israel. Such leaders would benefit from studying the Index and learning that while Israelis may not welcome Diaspora involvement in matters of security and the territories, they are eager to have Diaspora partners in enhancing Israel's Jewish and democratic character.

The report before you is rich with insights. In part, it follows the conclusions of Indices that preceded it, but it also brings to light new aspects of religion-state relations. It provides a compass for better understanding the connection between the issues of religion and state on the one hand, and the voting choices Israelis make. Alongside security, territorial and economic considerations, which are the overriding considerations for most voters in deciding who to vote for, the Index indicates that the battle over religion and the state also weighs heavily. It may decide the outcome when voters decide between parties whose security and economic agendas are similar to their views.

The Index presents a roadmap for understanding which issues potential voters attach the most importance to, identifies the target audiences of parties in terms of their religious identities and positions on these controversial issues, and explains the increase in votes for Yisrael Beiteinu when it shifted its focus to issues of religious freedom and equality of civic burden. It underscores the challenge facing both Blue & White and Yesh Atid in keeping their votes as they develop their positions on issues of religion and state in the current Knesset and when they come to prepare for upcoming elections, and more.

In particular, this report underscores the gap between the policies, which the governing parties pursue on matters of religion and state under pressure from the ultra-Orthodox parties, and the wills of their own constituents and that of Israel's entire adult Jewish public. This gap brings most of the components of the government coalition to the point of posing a growing threat to the rule of law and to the authority of the High Court and its independence.

They claim they do it in the name of democracy and the "will of the People". These politicians are undermining the legitimacy of the Court, accusing it of being detached from the People "that seeks tradition and religion", boasting that they and only they faithfully represent the will of the public. The Index demonstrates how cynical and artificial these claims are and illustrates the truth: that the public's trust in the Supreme Court is far greater than its trust in the Government, the Knesset and the Chief Rabbinate. This is despite the and blatant attacks against the Court, which carries the high price of undermining the foundations of Israeli democracy altogether and leads to increasing public distrust in all government institutions.

The Index presents the reader with good news; there is broad national consensus on religion and state issues. However, this consensus is radically different from the practice of generations of Israeli governments on the right, left and center. This broad national consensus, of about two-thirds of the adult Jewish public, and even more on some controversial issues, is characterized by the desire to see the full realization of the Declaration of Independence's assurances of "freedom of religion and conscience" and of "equality for all without religious distinction". The vast majority of the Jewish public supports Israel's identity as a Jewish and democratic state, and a large majority rejects attempts to transform it into a "Torah State" and enforce religious laws upon the general public.

This year's report is characterized by a slightly different design from its predecessors, as the visual presentation of the findings has been increased, and accompanying text has been reduced, highlighting the insights that emerge from the data. We are attaching an abridged version to the full report, whose main purpose is to present the issues of religion and state through the data and its visual representation, without the accompanying analysis.

We would love to hear from you and answer questions that arise for readers of the data and analysis herein. We are, of course, at your service in any matter related to the promotion of freedom of religion and equality, and we encourage you to express your support for a Jewish and democratic Israel, grounded in the assurances of its Declaration of Independence. You can do so easily by adding your name to the "Vision Statement for Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State", which has already gained the support of leaders, clergy, activists and organizations, in Israel and throughout the Diaspora, of all streams of Judaism and political inclinations. You can sign the Vision Statement [here](#).

With best wishes for the New Year,



RABBI URI REGEV, ESQ.
PRESIDENT AND CEO




STANLEY P. GOLD
CHAIR

What kind of Jews are Israeli Jews?


65% of Israelis identify themselves as secular [47%] or "traditional-not-religious" [18%] (whose positions regarding public policy on religion and state are close to the positions of secular Israelis), 10% - ultra-Orthodox (referred to in Israel as Haredi), 11% - Zionist Orthodox (referred to in Israel as National Religious or Zionist Religious) or Zionist ultra-Orthodox (referred to in Israel as Hardali), 14% - traditional-religious.

What kind of Jews are Israeli Jews?

Level of Religiosity



Political Outlook




Do Politics & Religion Correlate?

There is a clear correlation between political leanings and religious identity. A large majority of those who self-identify as ultra-Orthodox [84%], Zionist ultra-Orthodox [77%], and Zionist Orthodox [71%] identify as politically right-wing or very right-wing.

		Political Outlook				
		(by level of religiosity)				
	TOTAL	Ultra-Orthodox	Zionist Orthodox	Traditional-Religious	Traditional-not-religious	Secular
Very right & Right	45%	84%	73%	60%	52%	23%
Centrist right leaning	21%	12%	21%	18%	24%	23%
Centrist	20%	4%	5%	18%	17%	30%
Centrist left leaning & Left	14%	0%	1%	4%	7%	24%

Does Reform & Conservative Judaism Resonate with Israel Jews?

Self-Identification with Jewish Streams




Does Reform & Conservative Judaism Resonate with Israel Jews?

Self-Identification with Jewish Streams (by political outlook)

	TOTAL	Ultra-Orthodox	Zionist ultra-Orthodox	Zionist Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	None
Very right & Right	45%	84%	77%	71%	48%	39%	29%
Centrist right leaning	21%	10%	23%	17%	34%	14%	24%
Centrist	20%	4%	0%	11%	15%	29%	27%
Centrist left leaning & Left	14%	2%	0%	1%	3%	18%	20%

Does Reform & Conservative Judaism Resonate with Israel Jews?

Self-identification with Jewish Streams (by level of religiosity)




How do Israeli Jews View the Relationship Between Religion & State?

83% support freedom of religion and conscience in Israel [freedom of choice and behavior for secular and religious people according to their outlooks]; 63% support the separation of religion and state.


Freedom of Religion & Separation of Religion and State

■ Support ■ Oppose




How do Israeli Jews View the Relationship Between Religion & State?

Support for Religious Freedom & Separation of Religion and State (by level of religiosity)




How do Israeli Jews View the Relationship Between Religion & State?

Support for Freedom of Religion & Separation of Religion and State (over time)



How do Israeli Jews View the Relationship Between Religion & State?


Support for Freedom of Religion & Separation of Religion and State (by current voting intention)



How Severe is the Religion-State Conflict?


The tension between secular and ultra-Orthodox Israelis is perceived as close in its severity to that between political right and left on the scale of internal tensions in Israeli society [69% and 76% respectively], well above other major tensions [rich and poor - 17%; Eastern (referred to in Israel as Mizrahi or Sephardi) and European (referred to in Israel as Ashkenazi) descent - 15%; veteran Israelis and immigrants - 3%].

Principle Conflicts and Tensions in Israeli society




How Severe is the Religion-State Conflict?

Principle Conflicts and Tensions in Israeli Society (over time)




Religious Pluralism for Israel Too!

65% of the Israeli public supports equal status for the 3 major Jewish denominations - Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform. Among secular Israelis, the support rate is 88%. Traditional Israelis - 62% support it. 60% of those who voted for Likud in March 2020 and 91% of those who voted for Blue & White support it as well.




Religious Pluralism for Israel Too!

Equal Recognition for the Three Major Jewish Streams
(by level of religiosity)




Equal Recognition for the Three Major Jewish Streams
(by political outlook)




Religious Pluralism for Israel Too!

Equal Recognition for the Three Major Streams (by vote in March 2020 elections)




Equal Recognition for the Three Major Streams (over time)



Religious Pluralism for Israel Too!


63% support the engagement of Diaspora Jewish organizations in strengthening freedom of religion and pluralism in Israel [i.e. freedom of choice in marriage, ending the Chief Rabbinate's monopoly on matters of conversion, and more]. 85% of the secular public supports this, as does 65% of the traditional public, 56% of those who intend to vote for the Likud, 80% - for Blue & White, and 70% of those who are undecided.

Engagement of Diaspora Jewry in Israel's religion-state arena (among 84% who gave an opinion)




Religious Pluralism for Israel Too!

Engagement of Diaspora Jewry in Israel's religion-state arena (over time)




Engagement of Diaspora Jewry in Israel's religion-state arena (by level of religiosity)




Religious Pluralism for Israel Too!

Engagement of Diaspora Jewry in Israel's religion-state arena (by political outlook)



Support engagement of Diaspora Jewry in Israel's religion-state arena (by current voting intention)




Are the New Immigrants Jewish?

A large majority of Israelis does not see the need for religious conversion approved by the Chief Rabbinate as a condition for the State to recognize the Judaism of new immigrants. Only 34% consider conversion via the Chief Rabbinate is necessary, whereas 36% support the State's recognition of the Jewish identities of descendants who identify as Jewish born to at least one Jewish parent, whether it's the father or the mother, and another 30% would be satisfied with alternative religious conversions performed outside the auspices of the Chief Rabbinate, whether they are Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform. Only 9% of secular Israelis and 36% of those who are traditional see the need for conversion approved by the Chief Rabbinate. Only 41% of Likud voters and 11% of Blue & White voters in March 2020, as well as 28% of those who are currently undecided consider conversion via the Chief Rabbinate necessary.

Are the New Immigrants Jewish?

Question of 'Who is a Jew?' for New Immigrants (comparison with December 2019 survey)




2020 Index (86%)

2019 December survey (89%)


- Should be recognized as Jews if they identify as Jews, w/o religious conversion
- Should be recognized as Jews if they undergo religious conversion, whether Orthodox, Conservative, Reform
- Should be recognized as Jewish only if undergo conversion recognized by Chief Rabbinate

Question of 'Who is a Jew?' for New Immigrants (by level of religiosity)




Are the New Immigrants Jewish?

Question of 'Who is a Jew?' for New Immigrants (by political outlook)




Question of 'Who is a Jew?' for New Immigrants (by current voting intentions)




Religion, State, Politics

There has been strong and consistent opposition over the years to the participation of the ultra-Orthodox parties in the Government Coalition in a way that gives them the ability to dictate government policy and legislation on matters of religion and state. In the current Index, 64% are opposed. This is also the position of 74% of those who are undecided regarding their vote in the next election.




Religion, State, Politics

Opposed to Including ultra-Orthodox Parties in Coalition Government (by political outlook)




Oppose including ultra-Orthodox Parties in Coalition Government (by current voting intentions)




Religion, State, Politics

79% oppose the appointments of MK Rabbi Gafni to head the Knesset Finance Committee and MK Rabbi Asher to head the Knesset Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee. All political camps oppose this, including the right [63%]. Among those who are undecided about their votes in the next election - 89% oppose.




Religion, State, Politics

Opposition to Appointing Representatives of ultra-Orthodox Parties as Chairmen of Key Knesset Committees (by level of religiosity)




Opposition to Appointing Representatives of ultra-Orthodox Parties as Chairmen of Key Knesset Committees (by political outlook)



Religion, State, Politics

What issues are most important to the public to promote in the field of religion and state? The top three: freedom of religion and equality of civic burden in general, allowing public transportation on Shabbat, and civil marriage and divorce. Only 17% of the public responded that none of the issues listed were important to it. Only 1% of the secular public considered none of the listed issues important to it [and 6% of the traditional-non-religious public].



Religion, State, Politics

Ranking of Important Issues (by vote in March 2020 elections)

	Freedom of religion & equality of civic burden in general	Enforcing core curricular studies in ultra-Orthodox education	Allow public transportation on Shabbat	Allow limited opening of mini-markets and business on Shabbat	Recognize civil marriage and divorce	Enlist yeshiva students into military or civilian service	Cut budgets for yeshivas and religious programs	Prohibit exclusion of women in the public sphere	Abolition of Chief Rabbinate's kashrut monopoly	Equal recognition for non-Orthodox streams	Allow Women of the Wall and egalitarian groups to pray and read Torah at Kotel	None of these
Likud	27%	12%	27%	17%	21%	25%	12%	18%	30%	8%	4%	17%
Blue & White	49%	12%	45%	19%	37%	25%	29%	21%	25%	12%	2%	2%

Religion, State, Politics

Ranking of Important Issues (by current voting intentions)

	Freedom of religion & equality of civic burden in general	Enforcing core curricular studies in ultra-Orthodox education	Allow public transportation on Shabbat	Allow limited opening of mini-markets and business on Shabbat	Recognize civil marriage and divorce	Enlist yeshiva students into military or civilian service	Cut budgets for yeshivas and religious institutions	Prohibit exclusion of women in the public sphere	Abolition Chief Rabbinate's kashrut monopoly	Equal recognition for non-Orthodox streams	Allow Women of the Wall and egalitarian groups to pray and read Torah at Kotel	None of these
Likud	28%	14%	24%	14%	24%	23%	10%	21%	23%	7%	6%	18%
Blue & White	41%	9%	35%	23%	30%	36%	24%	23%	24%	10%	3%	4%
Yesh Atid	55%	15%	44%	17%	33%	24%	36%	19%	27%	11%	2%	0%
Yisrael Beiteinu	45%	13%	46%	22%	33%	32%	37%	13%	18%	10%	0%	0%
Yamina	24%	29%	21%	12%	17%	26%	18%	20%	35%	2%	1%	20%
Undecided	33%	11%	38%	18%	28%	24%	23%	18%	28%	11%	2%	14%

Religion, State, Politics

Ranking of Important Issues (by level of religiosity)

	Religious freedom & equality of civic burden in general	Enforcing core curricular studies in ultra-Orthodox education	Permitting public transportation on Shabbat	Permitting limited opening of mini-markets and business on Shabbat	Recognition of civil marriage & divorce	Enlisting yeshiva students into military or civilian service	Cutting budgets for yeshivas and religious institutions	Prohibition exclusion of women in the public sphere	Abolition the Chief Rabbinate's kashrut monopoly	Equal recognition for the non-Orthodox streams	Allow Women of the Wall & egalitarian prayer groups to pray and read Torah in the Kotel plaza	None of these	No opinion
TOTAL	32%	13%	31%	16%	26%	22%	20%	19%	24%	8%	2%	17%	6%
Ultra-Orthodox	1%	4%	2%	2%	1%	5%	4%	3%	1%	0%	1%	77%	10%
Zionist Orthodox	13%	16%	9%	4%	5%	17%	1%	12%	14%	2%	1%	48%	8%
Traditional-religious	26%	23%	12%	7%	17%	28%	15%	23%	25%	7%	2%	20%	10%
Traditional-not-religious	36%	14%	27%	18%	26%	31%	22%	24%	40%	9%	2%	6%	3%
Secular	44%	11%	49%	23%	39%	23%	28%	20%	24%	11%	3%	1%	4%

Religion, State, Politics


Ranking of Important Issues (by political outlook)

	Religious freedom & equality of civiv burden in general	Enforcin g core curricular studies in ultra-Orthodox education	Permitting public transportation on Shabbat	Permitting limited opening of mini-markets and business on Shabbat	Recogniti on of civil marriage & divorce	Enlisting yeshiva students into military or civilian service	Cutting budgets for yeshivas and religious institutions	Pro- hibition exclusion of women in the public sphere	Abolition the Chief Rabbinate's kashrut monopoly	Equal recognition for the non-Orthodox streams	Allow Women of the Wall & egalitarian prayer groups to pray and read Torah in the Kotel plaza	None of these	No opinion
TOTAL	32%	13%	31%	16%	26%	22%	20%	19%	24%	8%	2%	17%	6%
Very right & Right	22%	14%	21%	15%	19%	23%	13%	13%	21%	4%	3%	30%	6%
Centrist right leaning	38%	14%	37%	19%	27%	23%	15%	22%	27%	10%	1%	13%	4%
Centrist	45%	14%	37%	22%	32%	26%	34%	19%	26%	12%	3%	4%	2%
Centrist left leaning & Left	45%	12%	50%	10%	42%	18%	25%	30%	23%	16%	3%	2%	2%

Religion, State, Politics

62% expressed support for Blue & White to use the power it was granted in its coalition agreement with Likud to prevent the passage of legislation that contradicts its principles and promises on matters of religion and state. Among those who intend to vote for Blue & White in the next election - 90% support this.


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
Religion, State, Politics

Blue & White Should Prevent New Legislation that Contradicts its Promises on Matters of Religion & State

(by level of religiosity)



(by political outlook)



Religion, State, Politics


93% of Blue & White voters in the last election were secular or traditional-not-religious. After the party joined the Coalition with the ultra-Orthodox parties, the percentage of secular Israelis who intend to vote for it dropped to 66%, and the percentage of secular Israelis who intend to vote for Yesh Atid rose to 79%. A similar shift has taken place in the percentage of traditional-not-religious people who intend to vote for both parties.

	Breakdown of Votes by Level of Religiosity				
	(March 2020 elections)				
	Ultra-Orthodox	Zionist Orthodox	Traditional-religious	Traditional-not-religious	Secular
TOTAL	10%	11%	14%	18%	47%
Likud	2%	15%	26%	25%	32%
Blue & White	0%	1%	6%	19%	74%
Shas	64%	17%	15%	0%	4%
UTJ	93%	4%	3%	0%	0%
Yisrael Beiteinu	0%	0%	3%	13%	84%
Yamina	0%	46%	17%	27%	10%
Labor Geshet	0%	2%	5%	12%	81%

Religion, State, Politics

80% of secular voters responded that should a party [compatible with their political views on security and economic issues] commit itself to promoting freedom of religion and equality of civic burden, this would increase the likelihood that they would vote for it, compared to only 6% who responded that this would decrease the likelihood of that [namely, there exists a gap of 74% in favor of increasing the likelihood of secular Israelis voting for such a party]. Similarly, in relation to the traditional-not-religious public, the gap is significantly larger compared to the average among the general public [a gap of 52% in favor of "will increase the likelihood": 63% versus 11%].

Impact of Support for Religious Freedom upon Voting





Religion, State, Politics

Impact of Support for Religious Freedom upon Voting

	July 2020 Index (89%)	August 2019 Index (89%)	July 2018 Index (85%)	July 2017 Index (85%)
Increase likelihood	57%	55%	57%	56%
Decrease likelihood	23%	23%	19%	20%
No effect	20%	22%	24%	24%
The difference, in favor of "Increase"	+34%	+32%	+38%	+36%

Religion, State, Politics


Impact of Support for Religious Freedom upon Voting



Let Marriage Freedom Ring!


65% support State recognition of all forms of marriage [civil and religious, including Reform and Conservative]. Between 2009 and 2014 there was a gradual increase in the support rate, from 53% in 2009 To 66% in 2014. Since then it has stabilized at a rate of about 2/3 of the public. Most Likud voters [55%] and about half of Yamina voters [47%] support freedom of choice in marriage. Among undecided voters, the support rate is 72%.

Recognition of All Forms of Marriage (among 92% that gave an opinion)




Let Marriage Freedom Ring!

Recognition of All Forms of Marriage
(by level of religiosity)




Recognition of All Forms of Marriage
(by current voting intentions)




Let Marriage Freedom Ring!

Just under half of the adult Jewish public [49% of those who expressed a view] would choose Orthodox marriage if the State of Israel allowed them to choose [this includes those who would choose an Orthodox marriage outside the auspices of the Chief Rabbinate, meaning that the number who would prefer to marry under the auspices of the Chief Rabbinate is even lower]. The preference for Orthodox marriage gradually dropped from 65% in 2009 to 49%. Only 19% of the secular public would marry via the Rabbinate if given a choice.




Let Marriage Freedom Ring!

Preferred Marriage Framework
(over time)




Preferred Marriage Framework
(Breakdown by Secular public, Immigrants from FSU, & Blue and White voters)



Shabbat: Public and Private


Only 25% of the Israeli public observes Shabbat according to Halacha. 20% partially observe [e.g. lighting Shabbat candles or Kiddush], 34% consider Shabbat to be a day of rest with a special atmosphere, and 21% consider it a regular day off. Among the secular public 89% responded that it does not observe the Sabbath, either fully or partially.

Sabbath Observance
(over time)




Shabbat: Public and Private

Sabbath Observance
(by level of religiosity)



- According to halakha
- Partial observance (like lighting candles)
- Don't observe, but consider it a special day
- A regular day off


Sabbath Observance
(by political outlook)




Shabbat: Public and Private

As for the debate over allowing public transportation on Shabbat, which is currently not allowed throughout most of Israel, 71% of the public supports it [including 35% of the Zionist Orthodox public]. 96% of secular Israelis support public transportation on Shabbat, as does 66% of the traditional public. Excepting the ultra-Orthodox parties, voters for all parties expressed strong support for the introduction of public transportation on Shabbat, including 65% of Likud and Yamina voters, as well as 95% of Blue & White voters.

Public Transportation on Shabbat
(among 93% who gave an opinion)




Shabbat: Public and Private




Shabbat: Public and Private

Support allowing Public Transportation on Shabbat, at Discretion of Local Authorities

(by level of religiosity)



(by vote in march 2020 election)



Shabbat: Public and Private

There is a significant gap between the importance attached by the public to allowing public transportation on Shabbat [31%] to the importance it attaches to permitting mini-markets and businesses on Shabbat [16%]. This gap is consistent and also appeared in previous surveys. It shows that in the eyes of the public there is a difference between the two. This difference indicates that it is not a rejection of Shabbat altogether, but rather a nuanced and discerning approach.


Trust in the Supreme Court, not in Politicians and the Chief Rabbinate

Contrary to the rhetoric of politicians attacking the Supreme Court and undermining its legitimacy, of the four institutions relevant for comparison [the Government, Knesset, Supreme Court, and Chief Rabbinate] the highest level of public trust is in the Supreme Court. It is more than four times higher than the trust in the Government, 9 times higher than the trust in the Knesset, and 3.5 times higher than the trust in the Chief Rabbinate.


Among secular Israelis, 55% have the highest confidence in the Supreme Court, but only 3% have the highest confidence in the Knesset and 6% in the Government. The ultra-Orthodox also do not have much faith in the Knesset and the Government [3% and 4% respectively], even though they are represented in it, and they have 0% confidence in the Supreme Court and 56% have the highest confidence in the Chief Rabbinate.

Trust in the Supreme Court, not in Politicians and the Chief Rabbinate

Which State Institution does the Public Trust Most?



Which State Institution does the Public Trust most? (comparison with 2019 Index)



Trust in the Supreme Court, not in Politicians and the Chief Rabbinate

Which State Institution does the Public Trust Most?

(by level of religiosity)


	Knesset	Government	Supreme Court	Chief Rabbinate	None of these
Ultra-Orthodox	3%	4%	0%	56%	37%
Zionist Orthodox	15%	8%	6%	25%	46%
Traditional-religious	6%	12%	20%	14%	49%
Traditional-not-religious	3%	11%	36%	2%	47%
Secular	3%	6%	55%	1%	36%

Trust in the Supreme Court, not in Politicians and the Chief Rabbinate

	Which State Institution does the Public Trust Most?				
	(by political outlook)				
	Knesset	Government	Supreme Court	Chief Rabbinate	None of these
Very right & Right	6%	13%	12%	20%	49%
Centrist right leaning	5%	6%	40%	7%	43%
Centrist	3%	3%	61%	1%	32%
Centrist left leaning & Left	3%	2%	80%	1%	15%


Trust in the Supreme Court, not in Politicians and the Chief Rabbinate

Among those who expressed an opinion, 65% oppose the enactment of an override clause intended to infringe upon the authority and status of the Supreme Court. Likud voters were divided [38% supported and 34% opposed]. Among Blue & White voters, 79% oppose the legislation, and only 7% support it.




Trust in the Supreme Court, not in Politicians and the Chief Rabbinate

The Override Clause (by level of religiosity)




The Override Clause (by political outlook)



Corona and the ultra-Orthodox


74% of the public rejects the ultra-Orthodox sector's approach, according to which the corona virus was sent by God. This claim is rejected even by a small majority of the Zionist Orthodox public [51%].

COVID-19 was Sent by God




Corona and the ultra-Orthodox

70% reject the claim that criticism of the ultra-Orthodox sector in the context of the Corona crisis is based upon racism and hatred of the ultra-Orthodox.




Racism against ultra-Orthodox Sector in context of COVID-19 crisis




Corona and the ultra-Orthodox

Racism against ultra-Orthodox Sector in Context of COVID-19 Crisis (by political outlook)




Racism against ultra-Orthodox Sector in Context of COVID-19 Crisis (by level of religiosity)



Enough with the Draft Dodging


Only 22% of the public accepts the position of the ultra-Orthodox parties that yeshiva students should be exempted from military or civic service because "Torah is their craft." The position of the majority is that yeshiva students should be enlisted, except for a quota of exemptions for the exceptional scholars [49%], or they should all be enlisted [29%]. In all political camps there is opposition to the ultra-Orthodox position. Even among the right-wing camp, only 35% support it [22% of Likud voters in March 2020, and 20% of Yamina voters]. Among undecided voters, the percentage of support for the ultra-Orthodox position is only 10%.

Exempting Yeshiva Students (among 92% who gave an opinion)




Enough with the Draft Dodging

Enlisting Yeshiva Students (by level of religiosity)




Enlisting Yeshiva Students (by political outlook)





- All should be enlisted into IDF for full term of service
- A quota of exemptions must be set according to the IDF's needs, the rest must be enlisted into military or civilian service
- Acceptable because "Torah is their Craft"

Kashrut: Public & Private

While 100% of the ultra-Orthodox public and 98% of the Zionist Orthodox public is strict about keeping kosher according to Halacha, both at home and outside of the home, only 4% of the secular public adheres to the laws of kashrut in this manner. Overall, 38% of the public keeps strictly kosher, 27% partially keeps kosher, and 35% does not keep kosher.



Kashrut: Public & Private



Kashrut without the Chief Rabbinate

Only 21% responded that they would eat only in food establishments holding a kashrut certificate from the Chief Rabbinate, 21% would be satisfied with alternative kashrut certification, and 58% are not concerned with a kashrut certificate at all. Even among the 38% of the public who responded that they are strict about keeping kosher according to Halacha, only half [51%] responded that they would only consume food under the supervision of the Chief Rabbinate.


Position Regarding Kashrut Certification at Food Establishments (among 95% who gave an opinion)




- Only eat/purchase products only from restaurant w/ kashrut certificate from Chief Rabbinate
- Eat/purchase products from restaurant w/ kashrut certificate from Chief Rabbinate or reliable alternative in my eyes, such as "Tzohar Rabbis"
- A kashrut certificate is not a consideration for me in eating or purchasing products

Kashrut without the Chief Rabbinate

Position Regarding Kashrut Certification at Food Establishments (among those who claim to keep kosher)




Kashrut observance at Food Establishments (by level of religiosity)




Core Curriculum at ultra-Orthodox schools?

77% are of the opinion that all ultra-Orthodox boys' schools operating with state funding should be required to teach core curricular subjects on a full scale, like all public schools. [Among the non-ultra-Orthodox public, the support rate is 85%]. This is supported by a majority of voters of all political camps. [For example, 78% of Likud voters in March 2020 and 94% of Blue & White voters]. Similar findings also arise with regard to the matter of whether all ultra-Orthodox schools should be required to participate in the universal 'Growth and Effectiveness' exams, which are designed to enable an objective comparison and examination of schools' achievements in basic education.




Core Curriculum at ultra-Orthodox schools?

Support Obligating ultra-Orthodox Schools to Teach Core Curriculum like all other State Schools (by level of religiosity)




Support Obligating ultra-Orthodox Schools to Teach Core Curriculum like other State Schools (by vote in march 2020 elections)




Core Curriculum at ultra-Orthodox schools?

Ultra-Orthodox Schools Should be Required to Participate in the Growth and Effectiveness exams (among 90% who responded)




Ultra-Orthodox Schools Should be Required to Participate in the Growth and Effectiveness exams (by level of religiosity)



Core Curriculum at ultra-Orthodox schools?

Ultra-Orthodox Schools Should be Required to Participate in the Growth and Effectiveness exams
(by vote in March 2020 Elections)



About the Survey

The Index survey was conducted by the Smith Polling Institute by telephone between the 13th and 16th of July 2020, among an expanded sample of 800 people, a representative sample of Israel's adult Jewish population (aged 18 and over). Sampling error - $\pm 3.5\%$.

In this Report we sometimes use the general term "public" in reference to Israel's adult Jewish public, represented by the composition of the survey's representative sample. This is due, among other things, to the reality that the government's policy on religion & state continues to be shaped on the basis of political agreements made among the parties representing the Jewish public.

Change in this arena will be based first and foremost on changing political patterns in the Jewish sector. From time to time, reviews of the positions of the Arab public are also published on some of these issues [e.g. in publications by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics and the Guttman Institute's surveys within the framework of the Israel Democracy Institute], and Hiddush has also examined this extensively in the past, specifically on questions of marriage and personal status.